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I. INTRODUCTION 
Professor Leaffer, a doyen of copyright law and well-known 
and prolific copyright scholar, has provided a masterly review of 
recent copyright decisions by the Supreme Court. It should not be 
surprising that I find much with which to agree in what he says. 
That said, there are a few points—and I will assert professorial 
privilege here—that I would add, and some that I view rather 
differently than he does. 
As Professor Leaffer points out, it is challenging to find a 
unifying theme in the Court’s recent copyright cases or indeed in 
its recent intellectual property cases more generally. I think 
Professor Leaffer and I agree that the closest thing to an 
underlying theme in the cases we are here discussing—Eldred,1 
Tasini,2 and Dastar3—is the Court’s remarkable deference to 
 
†   Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law. 
1.  Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 235 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(quoting I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919. 967 (1983) (White, J. dissenting)). 
2.  New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001). 
1
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Congress. But perhaps unlike Professor Leaffer, I think it 
exceedingly odd that while in other areas this Court has not 
hesitated to rein in Congress’s power (particularly its Commerce 
Clause power),4 it seems to treat the limits on Congress’s power 
with regard to copyright as largely theoretical. 
Now, this is not a “theme” in the sense that legal scholars often 
use the term. I think that no coherent vision of copyright is 
reflected in these cases, and the majority opinions seem to rest 
mostly on a foundation of extreme caution. Nevertheless, I think 
we can examine the decisions and discern the direction in which 
they point. Professor Leaffer and I might disagree on that 
direction, but perhaps that reflects mainly my inherent pessimism 
and his relative optimism. 
I am concerned that the Court’s deference is becoming an 
“invincible repose on the status quo.”5 In copyright law, such 
deference means that the bargain among the content industries 
enacted as the Copyright Act of 1976 will be left untouched. 
Whether this is appropriate depends, of course, on the bargain. But 
once one realizes that the bargain encodes critical assumptions 
about the nature of copyright and copyrighted works, and that 
those assumptions are rapidly being washed away by the digital tide, 
merely maintaining the status quo is not only insufficient but 
sometimes impossible. In other words, the Constitution requires 
the Court, and in fact all of us, to reappraise the application of 
theory and doctrine to the world we actually live in. This is 
something the Court has often done6—but not in recent copyright 
cases.7 
What are these critical assumptions? Let me attempt to answer 
this question before I delve further into the mystery of the Court’s 
copyright direction. 
 
3.  Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 123 S. Ct. 
2041 (2003). 
4.  See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
5.  Bates v. Dresser, 251 U.S. 524, 530 (1920) (Holmes, J.). 
6.  See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Kyllo v. United 
States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
7.  In the past the Court has recognized the need to adapt traditional 
copyright concepts to changing technology. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
2
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 5 [2004], Art. 2
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss5/2
SCHAUMANN-FORMATTED 7/20/2004  5:46:05 PM 
2004] COPYRIGHT, CONTAINERS, AND THE COURT 1619 
II. THE NATURE OF AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW 
A.  Content Industry Bargaining and Copyright Law 
Since 1909, copyright law—with only two exceptions,8 neither 
of which is relevant here—has been written by a group of affected 
industries.9 Chief among them is the content industry, but the 
group also comprises the consumer electronics industry, the 
computer industry, authors (to a limited extent), librarians, and 
others.10 This pattern developed in the early years of the twentieth 
century when attempts to revise the Copyright Act as it then stood 
failed because one industry or another would hold the proposed 
legislation hostage in order to secure new or different benefits for 
itself.11 Eventually, Congress decided that the way to get copyright 
legislation passed was to let the affected industries write it. 
Copyright law is not unique in that it is heavily affected by 
special interests. However, it may be unique in the degree of 
influence that special interests have over it. It is literally the case 
that Congress has for the most part delegated its lawmaking 
authority to the content industry.12 This delegation has a number of 
possible consequences, not the least of which is that it could justify 
a bit less deference to legislation. Even a casual perusal of the 
Copyright Act reveals a statute that reads less like public policy and 
more like a very detailed contract made among numerous parties—
which, in a sense, it is. 
Another consequence is that, because Congress has largely 
abdicated its duty, the public is unrepresented in the making of 
copyright law. Here, as elsewhere, if you’re not at the table, you 
don’t get served. In the past, this was not especially troublesome, 
because copyright was rarely enforced against a member of the 
 
8.  The exceptions are: (i) the Computer Software Copyright Act of 1980, 
Pub. L. No. 96-517, sec. 10, § 117, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (1980), which revised § 117 
upon the recommendation of the Commission on New Technological Uses of 
Copyrighted Works (CONTU), a committee of experts charged with 
recommending copyright treatment of computer programs; and (ii) the Fairness 
in Music Licensing Act of 1998, Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. 
L. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827, which limited the number of institutions required to 
pay performance royalties for nondramatic musical works. See 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) 
(2004). 
9.  JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 23, 135-63 (2001). 
10.  Id. at 126. 
11.  Id. at 26. 
12.  Id. 
3
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public. Today, however, headlines are full of copyright litigation 
conducted against members of the public.  In addition, what the 
law hasn’t taken away is taken by the licenses to which we are 
constantly asked to agree. 
Finally, the making of law by industry suggests that perhaps the 
last protector of the public interest in copyright—and let us not 
forget that the public interest is the very reason for copyright—is the 
Supreme Court. This, too, would counsel more scrutiny, and less 
deference, by the Court. 
The process by which copyright law is made suggests that 
extreme deference by the Court might not be appropriate. But that 
is not the only reason to be skeptical about the Court’s recent 
decisions. The invalidation of at least one critical assumption 
underlying copyright also supports an approach less deferential 
than that adopted by the Court. Let us turn next to an examination 
of that assumption. 
B.  Content Unbound 
We have already noted that copyrights are being increasingly 
enforced against the public. We might at this point ask, “why?” For 
most of the last 100 years, members of the public rarely were 
copyright defendants. What has changed? The answer is that for 
most of the past, content was inextricably bound up with a tangible 
container. This fact alone prevented a lot of conflict between the 
public and the content industry. 
Historically, the dominant business model for the content 
industry was based on the distribution of content containers. For 
members of the public, both reproduction and distribution of 
analog containers were impractical, and this impracticality 
functioned as an adjunct to copyright, limiting infringement by 
practical, rather than legal, means. Reproduction of content 
containers was inherently limited by the expense of reproducing 
the containers, and by the degradation of analog copies. 
Distribution of content containers was limited mainly by its cost; 
large-scale distribution of physical goods is expensive.  In other 
words, in a world where access to content depends on 
manufacturing and distributing physical containers, being a 
content player required a large capital investment.  Most citizens 
couldn’t muster the investment, and wouldn’t care to if they could. 
Thus, there was, in the main, peace between consumers and the 
industry. 
4
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All this changed with the introduction of digital technology, 
which freed content from its container and thereby removed many 
of the barriers of entry into the content business. The result has not 
only been public competition, done without any profit motive 
(such as Napster and KaZaa), but also the creation of new kinds of 
publishing enterprises (such as Eric Eldred’s, based on digitizing 
and distributing works in the public domain). The content 
distribution channels have been radically reconfigured so that 
today content can be distributed worldwide, twenty-four hours a 
day, seven days a week, with little more than a high-speed Internet 
connection. 
Keeping this in mind, let us turn to the Supreme Court cases 
that are our focus. 
III. ELDRED V. ASHCROFT 
A.  Copyright Clause 
The result of the aforementioned developments is that the 
content industry has suddenly lost its former lock on control over 
distribution channels. This has provoked industry responses aimed 
at strengthening and extending the copyright monopoly to 
reconsolidate control over content. The copyright term extension 
was entirely consistent with this agenda.  Like other copyright 
legislation, it was a consensus product of the content industry. 
Testimony before Congress was heavily dominated by industry 
representatives.13 Almost no one spoke for the public interest. 
 
13.  See S. REP. NO. 104-315, at 5 (1996): 
The [Senate] Committee [on the Judiciary] held hearings on 
September 20, 1995. Bruce A. Lehman . . . and Marybeth Peters . . . 
testified on behalf of the Administration. The Committee also heard 
testimony from Jack Valenti, president and chief executive officer, 
Motion Picture Association of America; Alan Menken, composer, 
lyricist, and representative of AmSong; Patrick Alger, president, 
Nashville Songwriters Association; and Prof. Peter A. Jaszi, American 
University, Washington College of Law. In addition, written statements 
were received for the record from Senator Christopher J. Dodd, the 
American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP), the 
National Music Publishing Association Inc. (NMPA), the Songwriters 
Guild of America, the Graphic Artists Guild, the National Writers 
Union, the Coalition of Creators and Copyright Owners, Author 
Services Inc., the Midwest Travel Writers Association, Donaldson 
Publishing Co., the American Library Association, the American Film 
Heritage Association, the Society for Cinema Studies, Lawrence 
5
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Naturally, as far as the record reveals, the industry representatives 
spoke neither of consolidating control over distribution nor of 
Mickey Mouse.14 Rather, great emphasis was laid on the European 
Union’s recent commensurate extension of the copyright term, 
and of United States copyright owners being disadvantaged in 
Europe.15 That European copyright is not answerable to the 
Constitution and is not thereby bound to serve the interest of the 
public was evidently not considered important. 
One of the striking things about the Eldred opinion is that it 
conveys no sense of change in the copyright landscape. The Court 
appears either unaware of, or uninterested in, the profound 
changes that are reshaping the reproduction and distribution of 
content. Rather, Eldred gives the impression that nothing at all is 
new, and that one can comfortably rely on Congress to protect the 
public interest in the matter of copyright, thereby converting the 
issue into a rather minor disagreement about the proper length of 
protection. 
If one accepts that what is at stake is a mere question about 
what length of copyright optimizes the creation and distribution of 
new works, then Eldred’s approach is undoubtedly correct. 
However, many do not accept that view and believe instead that the 
Court’s deference to Congress seems unjustified. Were the Court to 
recognize that copyright law is not the product of a reasoned 
balance crafted by Congress, but rather the self-interested rent-
seeking of an industry threatened with obsolescence, it might well 
have been willing to characterize the question as involving limits on 
 
Technology, Bob Dylan Jr., Don Henley, Carlos Santana, Stephen 
Sondheim, Mike Stoller, E. Randol Schoenberg, Ginny Mancini, Lisa 
M. Brownlee, Prof. William Patry, and Prof. Dennis Karjala, writing on 
behalf of 45 intellectual property law professors. 
To similar effect, see H.R. REP. NO. 105-452, at 5 (1998): 
The [House Judiciary] Committee’s Subcommittee on Courts and 
Intellectual Property held a hearing on the issue of copyright term 
extension on June 27, 1997. Testimony was received from Fritz Attaway 
representing the Motion Picture Association of America; George David 
Weiss, representing the Songwriters Guild of America; Frances Preston, 
representing Broadcast Music, Incorporated; and Professor Jerome 
Reichman of Vanderbilt Law School. 
14.  Larry Lessig, among others, has attributed the CTEA largely to efforts by 
the Walt Disney Co. to maintain copyright protection in effect for Mickey. See 
Lawrence Lessig, How I Lost the Big One, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Mar.-Apr. 2004, at 57, 
available at http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/March-April-2004/story_lessig_ 
marapr04.html (last visited July 8, 2004). 
15.  H.R. REP. NO. 105-452 (1998); S. REP. NO. 104-315 (1996). 
6
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 5 [2004], Art. 2
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss5/2
SCHAUMANN-FORMATTED 7/20/2004  5:46:05 PM 
2004] COPYRIGHT, CONTAINERS, AND THE COURT 1623 
congressional power rather than policies about term length. That 
is, the question was not whether Congress or the Court can better 
determine what is the optimal term of protection; rather, the 
question was whether the Court should read the Constitution to 
impose limits on congressional power to extend terms indefinitely. 
The Court could have viewed the issue in Eldred as whether a term 
that can be indefinitely extended is “limited.” Congress’s assertion 
that it can extend existing terms as it chooses would then be 
suspect as a question of congressional power, and not merely as a 
question of policy. The Court’s unwillingness to confront this 
directly is deeply troubling.  After all, some might argue (as did 
Sonny Bono) that the best policy would be to have unlimited 
copyright terms. If all questions of term come down to mere 
questions of policy, then the constitutional requirement of a 
limited term is meaningless. 
Unsurprisingly, the petitioner’s arguments in Eldred were 
directed largely to the question of congressional power. In cases 
dealing with federalism and the Commerce Clause,16 the Court has 
opined that the Constitution must be interpreted in a way that is 
consistent with limits on federal power. Surely, if this is true for the 
Commerce Clause it is also true for the Copyright Clause. But the 
Eldred majority did not even cite its earlier Commerce Clause cases, 
despite petitioner’s written and oral argument relying largely on 
them.17 If Congress (that is, the content industry) can simply 
extend existing terms as it sees fit, where is the limited term 
required by the Constitution? It should be quite apparent that this 
question is not at all the same as asking what the optimal term 
length is, but the Court addressed only the latter. 
The Court also relied on history, but the weight of history in 
Supreme Court analysis depends entirely on the context. The 
Court has not hesitated to invalidate unconstitutional exercises of 
congressional power, even those supported by histories far more 
extensive than copyright and patent legislation. In INS v. Chadha,18 
for example, the Court invalidated “ ‘nearly 200 other statutory 
provisions’ in which Congress had exercised a ‘legislative veto.’ ”19 
 
16.  United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
17.  See Lessig, supra note 14, at 57. 
18.  462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
19.  Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 235 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Chadha, 462 U.S. at 967 (White, J. dissenting)). 
7
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Clearly, Congress’s earlier unconstitutional exercise of legislative 
power cannot immunize it against a properly framed challenge, yet 
the Court chose to defer. It should be clear by now that the Court’s 
deference was a choice, and not a necessity. 
In short, I find it difficult to be as sanguine about the 
copyright clause analysis in Eldred as is Professor Leaffer. To me, 
the case demonstrates the Court’s willingness to continue to 
indulge in fictions—that Congress legislates copyright with an eye 
on the public interest; that the copyright landscape is 
fundamentally unaltered—that will, if they continue, threaten the 
progress of science that copyright is supposed to promote. The 
sooner the Court can come to grips with copyright reality, the 
better off progress—and society—will be. In the meantime, I hope 
that Professor Leaffer’s prediction that this will be the last 
extension of copyright20 turns out to be correct. His prediction that 
further extensions would likely be upheld21 bodes ill because I 
suspect the content industry will continue to press for expansion as 
long as its ability to do so goes unchecked. 
B.  First Amendment 
Likewise, I find little ground for optimism in Eldred’s First 
Amendment treatment. Professor Leaffer notes that the Court 
relied upon the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use 
doctrine to accommodate the First Amendment, and sees in that 
reliance “real constraints on the scope of copyright law.”22 What I 
see is a rhetorical device that the Court used to avoid more 
meaningful analysis of the relationship between copyright and the 
First Amendment. 
To begin with, the Court’s—and indeed, copyright’s—reliance 
on the idea/expression dichotomy as a bulwark of First 
Amendment protection assumes an ability to distinguish between 
idea and expression that is often, perhaps more often than not, 
absent. To the extent this supposed dichotomy has meaning, it is 
limited to ideas expressed in words, and even there, it can be 
devilishly tricky to sort out what is idea from what is expression.23 
 
20.  Marshall Leaffer, Life After Eldred: The Supreme Court and the Future of 
Copyright, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1597, 1603 (2004). 
21.  Id. 
22.  Id. at 1605. 
23.  See SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS 28-34 (New York 
University Press 2001). Compare Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 
8
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And if we are talking about ideas expressed in other ways, such as 
music or images, the idea/expression dichotomy is an exercise in 
metaphysics that cannot be applied consistently. Notably, the Eldred 
Court was indeed confronted with claims by persons wishing to 
make use of musical works.24 It is little consolation to them that 
their First Amendment rights are protected by the idea/expression 
dichotomy. 
Of course, one might object that for works as to which the 
idea/expression dichotomy is inadequate, the fair use doctrine still 
exists. Unfortunately for the likes of Eric Eldred, deciding whether 
a particular use is fair is generally one of the last decisions made in 
the course of copyright litigation. Therefore, anyone relying on the 
fair use doctrine has to be willing to spend a great deal of money, 
often upward of $100,000, to defend his or her right to speak. This 
chilling effect would not be tolerated in most speech contexts, but 
in copyright cases it seems not to concern the Court. 
Now, I do agree with Professor Leaffer that Eldred leaves open 
a First Amendment argument—specifically, that a particular 
enactment “altered the traditional contours of copyright 
protection,”25 which could necessitate “further First Amendment 
scrutiny.”26 I, too, hope that this will someday lead to meaningful 
First Amendment review of property claims in speech. But, I believe 
such a review is unlikely, at least with the current composition of 
the Court. 
C.  Copyright Maintenance 
Where Professor Leaffer and I find our strongest agreement is 
 
(1st Cir. 1967) (idea for sweepstakes instructions merged with expression, 
therefore uncopyrightable) with Quality King Distrib. v. L’anza Research Int’l, 523 
U.S. 135 (1998) (instructions for shampooing hair copyrightable). 
24.  United States Supreme Court Petitioner’s Brief at 3-4, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 
537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), available at 2002 WL 1041928. 
Petitioners Luck’s Music Library, Inc. and Edwin F. Kalmus & Co., Inc. 
specialize in selling and renting classical orchestral sheet music . . . . 
Both sell to thousands of customers worldwide, including many 
community and scholastic orchestras . . . . Both had made preparations 
to release new sheet music for work that was to pass into the public 
domain in 1998. This included the work of Bela Bartok, Maurice J. 
Ravel, [and] Richard Strauss . . . . Those plans have been blocked for 
20 years. 
Id. 
25.  Eldred, 537 U.S. at 191. 
26.  Id. 
9
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with his proposed solution to the problem of term extension, 
namely the institution of a maintenance requirement for 
copyrights extended beyond fifty years after the author’s death. For 
my part, I would rather the petitioners in Eldred had won, but, 
failing that, Professor Leaffer’s proposed solution would help 
ameliorate the relentless expansion of copyright. A similar proposal 
has been made in Congress, in a bill titled the Public Domain 
Enhancement Act.27 Such a requirement would not only enhance 
the public domain, but would also relieve some of the burden on 
speech that copyright imposes. The vast majority of copyrighted 
works have no economic life left fifty years after the author has 
died; the Berne Convention, TRIPS, and NAFTA require no more 
than life plus fifty years. So this step would, at least, not make 
things worse. 
While it is a worthy proposal, its chances of passing are slim to 
none. After all, it is the content industry and not Congress that will 
evaluate the proposal. And given that the bill offers nothing to the 
industry, but simply takes away rights—even rights that have no 
value—the industry will not support it. The track record for 
copyright bills without content industry support leads me to 
conclude, regretfully, that the new term is life plus seventy years, 
and that the public domain will have to wait twenty more years to 
see any growth. That is, unless Congress extends copyright again, 
something that Professor Leaffer sees as unlikely but legal, and that 
I see as likely and, given the Eldred decision, probably legal as well. 
IV. TASINI V. NEW YORK TIMES 
Tasini was another case reaffirming the Court’s view that when 
it comes to copyright, nothing has changed. Professor Leaffer has 
ably and accurately characterized the issues in the case, which 
turned upon the meaning of the word “revision” in § 201(c) of the 
Copyright Act, providing that unless expressly otherwise specified, 
the 
owner of copyright in [a] collective work is presumed to 
have acquired only the privilege of reproducing and 
distributing the contribution as part of that particular 
collective work, any revision of that collective work, and 
 
27.  H.R. 2601, 108th Cong., (1st Sess. 2003). The bill is currently languishing 
in the House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, 
and Intellectual Property. See http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/ 
z?d108:h.r.02601: (last visited July 8, 2004). 
10
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any later collective work in the same series. 
The defendant newspapers had authorized the inclusion of 
plaintiffs’ contributions in electronic databases. The authors of the 
articles sued. The case raised the question whether an electronic 
database is a “revision” of a newspaper, so that the defendants had 
sufficient rights to authorize the inclusion of plaintiff’s work in the 
databases. The court held that electronic databases are not 
privileged “revisions” of collective works. 
Professor Leaffer argues that the outcome of Tasini is 
problematic, while the Court’s reasoning is sound. I believe the 
opposite is true. To me, the outcome of the case—a victory for 
authors, and a defeat for publishers—is not only a good one, but, 
given the “pro-author basis of § 201,”28 is probably the only 
outcome the Court could have achieved without doing violence to 
the Act and its legislative history. On the other hand, I find the 
reasoning in Tasini to be sadly lacking. 
Let us begin with the outcome. This is a case that authors won 
against their publishers. As such it is quite rare, because in general 
publishers will take, by their publishing contracts, nearly every 
valuable right that the law gives the author. The alienability of 
copyright is the only reason that publishers support giving rights to 
authors; this much, at least, has not changed since the Statute of 
Anne.29 So it is perhaps no surprise that even before Tasini was 
decided, publishers had begun to demand express transfers of the 
right to electronic reproduction and distribution. More surprising 
was the reaction of the publisher defendants after the decision was 
announced: Rather than bargaining with the authors in good faith, 
as the Court had suggested the publishers might do,30 they removed 
all material contributed by the authors, expunging it from 
electronic databases. Surely this was not the Court’s fault: § 201(c) 
was written with the protection of authors in mind, as the Court 
recognized.31 That the publishers would exploit their market power 
to extract the right of electronic publication from the authors is 
not something that the Court can control. In short, I think the 
Court reached the correct legal conclusion, notwithstanding the 
 
28.  Leaffer, supra note 20 at 1610. 
29.  1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.). 
30.  Tasini, 533 U.S. at 505 (“The parties (Authors and Publishers) may enter 
into an agreement allowing continued electronic reproduction of the Authors’ 
works . . . .”). 
31.  Id. at 496 n.3. 
11
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publishers’ bad behavior following the decision. 
The reasoning of Tasini, on the other hand, I find 
troublesome. The case is far from media-neutral, in my view. 
Instead, the Court’s reasoning focuses almost entirely on what the 
electronic database presentation looks like to a user.32 But as it 
turns out, the Court does not mean that the content of the sued-on 
works must look different. According to the Court, the difference 
that matters for copyright purposes is that the material extraneous 
to the article—the material appearing on pages unconnected with 
the article—is not reproduced and distributed when articles are 
distributed electronically.33 In other words, the fact that you cannot 
see what is on the surrounding pages is what makes the publishers’ 
actions infringing. 
This triumph of container-centered reasoning deserves a 
special mention. The Court implies that the separation of content 
from container results in a new work. Certainly, as the publishers 
argued, the articles themselves are identical to those published in 
the newspapers. Proper attribution back to the newspaper was, 
apparently, always given. That the articles were taken out of their 
physical containers—and therefore the other content included in 
those containers was no longer present—was enough to persuade 
the Court that these presentations could not be “revisions” within 
§  201(c). Thus, the Court has effectively frozen § 201(c) in time, 
limiting it to the technology that existed at the time it was drafted. 
 
32.  Id. at 500-02 & n.11. 
33.  To understand this, one must understand that: 
GPO [General Periodicals Online, one of the infringing electronic 
databases] contains articles from approximately 200 publications or 
sections of publications.  Unlike NEXIS and NYTO [New York Times 
Online, another infringing database], GPO is an image-based, rather 
than a text-based, system. The Times has licensed GPO to provide a 
facsimile of the Times’ Sunday Book Review and Magazine. UMI 
“burns” images of each page of these sections onto CD-ROMs. The CD-
ROMs show each article exactly as it appeared on printed pages, 
complete with photographs, captions, advertisements, and other 
surrounding materials. UMI [University Microfilms International, 
another defendant] provides an index and abstracts of all the articles 
in GPO. 
Tasini, 533 U.S. at 491. Further, “[i]n GPO, the article appears with the other 
materials published on the same page or pages, but without any material 
published on other pages of the original periodical.” Id. at 500. GPO was the most 
inclusive database among those mentioned. Nevertheless, including images of the 
entire pages on which the articles originally appeared was not enough. Missing 
were the pages on which the article did not appear. A better example of container-
centered copyright reasoning would be hard to find. 
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Only container-centered technology, or complete reconstructions 
of container-centered technology, will result in a privileged 
“revision” of a collective work. 
On the other hand, the publishers’ exploitation of the articles, 
and their exclusion of the authors from participation in the profits 
realized from that exploitation, is surely troubling. Is another 
analysis possible, one that does not anchor the Copyright Act to the 
technology of 1976? To begin, consider—as did the Court—how 
users actually interact with the electronic databases in issue. 
Generally, a user inputs a request for material, which is then 
displayed on the computer screen. This is a critical event: an article 
that can be summoned up for display by any member of the public 
who has paid, or is willing to pay, a fee is a “public” display. As such, 
it is a distinct form of exploitation of the article and, more to the 
point, one that is not covered by the limited privilege given 
publishers in § 201(c). 
The Register of Copyrights made this argument to the Court 
in an amicus brief.34 Here was an opportunity for the Court to take 
a step into copyright reality: In electronic media, public display is 
often what matters (and when it isn’t, public performance and 
public distribution stand ready). But the Court, resting on the 
status quo and assuming that content must be bound to a container 
(else it is a “new work”), decided not to address the Register’s 
argument.  Instead, the Court decided the case on the ground that 
the absence of the surrounding content—which, from the user’s 
perspective, is merely surplusage—determines that the work is not 
a “revision.” 
V. DASTAR CORP. V. TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX FILM CORP. 
Finally, we come to Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film 
Corp.,35 and I am happy to say that at least with respect to this case, 
Professor Leaffer and I agree compl—well, almost completely. 
Dastar raised the question whether, after a work has passed into the 
public domain, later users must continue to credit the author of 
the work. Nothing in the Copyright Act requires such a result, and 
Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court, held that nothing in 
the Lanham Act does, either. 
The significance of Dastar is that what it means for a work to be 
 
34.  Tasini, 533 U.S. at 498 n.8. 
35.  539 U.S. 23, 123 S. Ct. 2041 (2003). 
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in the public domain remains unchanged. The United States has 
not historically recognized the moral right of attribution (or 
“paternity”), and Justice Scalia’s opinion makes it clear that the 
Lanham Act is not the proper basis for such a right. To require 
attribution of works in the public domain would create a copyright-
like right outside of the Copyright Act. Recognizing that purchasers 
of communicative products such as books and videos probably care 
more about the author of the content than they do about the 
producer of the physical item,36 the Court nevertheless held that 
requiring attribution of works under the Lanham Act would 
conflict impermissibly with the Copyright Act.37 
In so holding, the Court nearly (but not quite) implies that the 
Commerce Clause power cannot be exercised in a way that conflicts 
with the Copyright Clause. Justice Scalia says “[t]o hold [that the 
Lanham Act requires attribution] would be akin to finding that § 
43(a) created a species of perpetual patent and copyright, which 
Congress may not do.”38 That is, Congress cannot do under the 
Lanham Act (based on the Commerce Clause) what it may not do 
under the Copyright Act. This is, of course, not the same as 
deciding the case on constitutional grounds, but we public domain 
advocates must settle for the crumbs we can get these days. 
Professor Leaffer is very likely correct when he points out that 
the Court’s reading of the Lanham Act puts the United States out 
of compliance with its Berne Convention obligations.39 Article 6bis 
of Berne requires signatory nations to grant authors the right to 
claim authorship of their work. After Dastar, however, it seems that 
in the United States no right of attribution exists once the work has 
passed into the public domain (at least for works not within the 
 
36.  Dastar, 123 S. Ct. at 2047-48. 
37.  Id. at 2048. 
38.  Id. at 2050. 
39.  It isn’t actually clear that the Berne Convention requires works in the 
public domain to be attributed to their authors. The language of the treaty 
addressing duration says merely, “The rights granted to the author . . . shall, after 
his death, be maintained, at least until the expiry of the economic rights.” Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 24, 1971, art. 
6bis, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27. In this case, the author was corporate and “death” 
had no copyright significance. Perhaps, then, when the work has fallen into the 
public domain, the economic rights have expired and therefore the Berne 
Convention has nothing to say about attribution. Of course, it remains true that 
United States copyright law provides no right of attribution even during the work’s 
economic life, but this has been so for as long as the United States has had a 
copyright law and is not the result of the Dastar decision. 
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narrow classification of “works of visual art”40).  The Berne 
Convention compliance problem is a thorny one, but the Court is 
right not to interpret the Lanham Act with a view to ensuring 
compliance with Berne. Still, it is interesting that the Court was 
willing in this case to overlook international (Berne) issues, while 
in Eldred, the supposed “harmonization” with Europe provided part 
of the rational basis for Congress’s action in extending copyright.41 
Like Professor Leaffer, I am not convinced that Dastar signals 
the Court’s views on whether legislation based on the Commerce 
Clause is permitted even when it would conflict with the Copyright 
Clause. To me, the most reassuring thing about Dastar is that the 
Court declined to create new copyright-like rights in public domain 
works. Given the trend of the Court’s recent cases, that is perhaps 
something for which one should be properly grateful. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
I find little with which to be pleased in the Court’s recent 
copyright cases. The Court seems to be fighting a holding action, 
fending off the future by resolutely gazing backward. While the 
Court has not itself enlarged copyright, it has not meaningfully 
evaluated Congress’s power to do so, and its decisions freeze 
copyright into a moment in time long past. Until copyright law 
recognizes that content is no longer container-bound, it will 
continue to flounder, desperately seeking analogies to the past and 
missing the significance of the technological changes all around us. 
That said, I agree with Professor Leaffer that the future is not 
black but gray. I believe that there is still much that can be done 
about the expansion of copyright and its increasing concentration 
into the hands of a media oligopoly, beginning with an awakening 
of public concern with those vital rights that are eroded as 
copyright expands. As long as that can happen, there is hope. 
Sadly, if that does not happen, then I don’t think either Congress 
or the Court will save us from ourselves. 
 
40.  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2004). 
41.  The harmonization accomplished by the CTEA is more apparent than 
real; United States copyright law is dramatically different in many important 
respects from its European counterparts, and the CTEA did little to change that, 
even with respect to the duration of copyright. See United States Supreme Court 
Petitioner’s Brief at 42-43, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), 
available at 2002 WL 1041928. 
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